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Development and psychometric properties of a new measure of irrational thinking: The 




Analyze the psychometric properties of a new measure for the assessment of the irrational 
beliefs proposed by Ellis in his model of Rational-Emotive-Behavioral Therapy (REBT): the 
Scale of Irrational Contents and Styles – Basics (SICS-B). The SICS-B evaluates the 
"contents" of the three basic irrational beliefs (Ap: Approval, Pe: Perfectionism, and Co: 
Comfort) in relation to the four different "styles" (inferences or processes of thought) in 
which they can be expressed (DEM: Demandingness, AWF: Awfulizing, FI: Frustration 
Intolerance, and CON: Condemnation). 
 
Methods 
Participants: 259 respondents (79.5% women) undergraduates (63%) and (post)graduates 
(37%) between 18-63 years (M=26.5, SD=10.7). Procedure: A set of 72 statements were 
drafted (half in a rational way) using a 5-point Likert scale to cover the three areas of content 
and the four styles of irrational thinking (3x4 subscales), of which to choose the three items of 
each area with highest psychometric indices and elaborate with them the definitive scale of 36 
items. Psychometric Analysis: The reliability and validity study was carried out through a 
comparative item analysis (average inter-item correlations, item-total correlations) and 




The SICS-B presents good indices of internal consistency and content validity. Confirmatory 
factor analyses validate the 3x4 model in which the three specific contents of the irrational 




















Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) is a well-grounded psychological intervention 
model, although not without criticisms (e.g., Ellis, 1996, 2001; Neenan, 2001), with a long 
history and proven clinical utility (David, Cotet, Matu, Mogoase, and Stefan, 2018; David, 
Lynn, and Ellis, 2010). In REBT, "irrational beliefs" are considered central factors of 
dysfunctional emotions and maladaptive behaviors present in several kinds of emotional 
distress, clinical symptoms and psychopathological disorders (e.g., Balkis and Duru, 2019; 
Buschmann, Horn, Blankenship, García, and Bohan, 2018; Culhane and Watson, 2003; 
David, Montgomery, Macavei, and Bovbjer, 2005; Fives, Kong, Fuller, and DiGiuseppe, 
2011; Fulton, Marcus and Merkey, 2010; Harrington, 2006; Martin and Dahlen, 2004; 
McDermut, Haaga, and Bilek, 1997; McDermut, Pantoja, and Amrami, 2019; McLennan, 
1987; Muran and Motta, 1993; Newmark and Whitt, 1983; Samar, Walton, and McDermut, 
2013; Woods and Lyons, 1990). From the perspective of REBT, irrational beliefs are, in 
essence, part of one’s evaluative cognitions (appraisals) about oneself, others, and the 
functioning of the world that constitute the organising principles behind reality and one’s own 
experience. Specifically, they are considered “irrational” due to their absolutist 
(rigid/dogmatic), illogical (founded on erroneous attributions/deductions), and dysfunctional 
(since they interfere with the realisation of one’s objectives, generating emotional 
perturbation) nature (Ellis, 1994; Lega, Caballo and Ellis, 2002; Tobacyk and Milford, 1982). 
Ellis distinguishes such irrational beliefs in terms of their basic contents and of the inferential 
thought processes that are derived from them (Lega et al., 2002). The latter are at the root of 
the different types of prototypical dysfunctional attitude and, in what follows, are what we 






The content of irrational beliefs refers to the “theme” (subject) they deal with. Fundamental 
themes are those that refer to the basic incentives or motivation for our lives (e.g., approval, 
perfection, or comfort). When these are irrationally considered to be demands (needs or 
dogmatic impositions) or requirements that we cannot renounce (“false needs” in Ellis’ 
terms), then they induce the people who hold them to respond in a dysfunctional way (through 
upsetting negative emotions and maladapted behaviour). It is precisely this prototypical 
dysfunctional way that people respond when they try to satisfy the contents of such 
inescapable demands or needs “at all costs” what defines the irrational style of behaviour 
(e.g., awfulizer/catastrophizer, intolerant/victim mentality [FI, frustration intolerance, in Ellis’ 
terms], or condemner/global-downing). 
 
In the most recent version of his theory (Ellis, 1994, 1999; Ellis et al., 2010; Kendall et al., 
1995; Lega et al., 2002; Sorribes and Lega, 2013), Ellis condenses the eleven beliefs initially 
proposed (Ellis, 1962; 1980) into just three basic irrational beliefs. By focusing on their 
content, they are designated and characterised as: seeking “Approval” (Ap), which is the need 
to be accepted and to be treated by everyone in a friendly, considerate, and respectful way; 
pursuing “Perfection” (Pe), which refers to the need to perform everything that one sets out to 
do flawlessly without any errors at all; and desiring “Comfort” (Co), which is defined as the 
need for the circumstances of one’s life to be agreeable and pleasant, so that they do not lead 
to difficulties, awkwardness, or tension. As far as the styles (inferences or irrational secondary 
processes that are derived from the content) are concerned, Ellis suggests the following four. 
Being “Demanding” (DEM) is the general tendency to display rigid positions towards the 
satisfaction of false needs related to the contents already mentioned; that is, through requiring 
others to accept you and treat you well, through perfectionism in one’s personal life, and in 





magnify the negative aspects of an event which leads to the exaggerated conclusion that the 
consequences will be terrible. Having “Frustration intolerance” (FI) is the tendency to 
magnify what is unbearable about a situation and to see it as unsupportable when you realise 
that it rules out all possibility, present or future, of being happy or of satisfying the need that 
is considered an imperative. “Condemning” (CON) is the tendency to assess one’s own worth 
or that of others, or the conditions of one’s life as being negative as a result of individual 
behaviour (through error or omission) or the circumstances of one’s life, which then 
compromises one’s entire personal worth. When this last attitude is highly consolidated, the 
condemnation is also generalised towards others, towards the functioning of the world, or 
towards life in general, insofar as these fail to satisfy one’s personal expectations. 
 
In this way, each irrational belief has a basic content and this can be expressed fundamentally 
in the form of a “demand” (the DEM basic style towards a false need) using the terms of the 
specific content of the need (e.g., ‘I need the approval of everybody who is important to me’; 
‘I must be perfect‘, etc.). Meanwhile, it can also take on a more elaborate form and be 
expressed through exaggerated references to the consequences of not satisfying it (e.g., ‘it is 
horrible that others think badly of me’; ‘I cannot bear to make mistakes’, etc.). Similarly, 
each content can be expressed in any of the different styles either directly (e.g., ‘I am very 
strict regarding my failures’) or indirectly, in the negative form (e.g., ‘I must not make a 
mistake’); and also either rationally (e.g., ‘I can handle it when people criticise me’) or 
irrational (e.g., ‘I must do everything perfectly’). In addition, the focus of the demand can be 
oneself (e.g., ‘I hate myself when I do not do as I should’), others (e.g., ‘People who say nasty 
things about me are cruel and heartless for doing it’), or the world/life in general (e.g., ‘It is 
awful that life is so complicated’). In theory, and independently of the way in which they are 





one from the other through following an “inferential chain”. What makes some people 
different from others, as well as both the contents and styles of the irrational beliefs that we 
manifest, is the frequency of such beliefs and their intensity or the degree of adherence that 
we exercise towards them.  
 
Several different scales have been designed to evaluate the irrational beliefs proposed by 
Ellis. However, currently there is no a 'gold standard' for the evaluation of REBT constructs, 
since many measures have failed to evaluate the relevant beliefs proposed by the theory, so 
that new instruments are currently being developed or refined (e.g., DiGiuseppe, Leaf, 
Gorman, and Robin, 2018; Hyland, Fox, Treacy, Maguire, Boduszek, and Vallières, 2017). 
An exhaustive review of most instruments developed is offered in Terjesen, Salhany, and 
Sciutto (2009) and also in Macavei and McMahon (2010). Of all the scales that evaluate 
irrational beliefs differentiating contents and styles, only the “Attitudes and Beliefs 
Inventory” (ABI) by Burgess (1990) has been adapted for use in Spanish (Caballo, Lega and 
González, 1996). Nevertheless, different studies have pointed out that the ABI presents a 
range of different psychometric problems, among which stand out the low internal 
consistency and the poor discriminatory validity of some of the irrational items in terms of the 
contents and styles proposed in the theory, together with the minimal use made of the rational 
items (Ruiz and Fusté, 2013; 2015; Suso-Ribera et al., 2016). This is why we herein present 
the new “Scale of Irrational Content and Styles – Basics” (SICS-B), the aim of which is to 
facilitate evaluation of the contents of the three “basic” irrational beliefs (Ap: approval, Pe: 
perfectionism, and Co: comfort) in relation to the four different styles (inferences or thought 
processes) through which they can manifest (DEM: demanding; AWF: awfulizing; FI: 









The general objective of the present study is to analyse the psychometric properties of the 
“Scale of Irrational Content and Styles – Basics” (SICS-B) that we propose herein. More 




In general terms, the present work is an empirical study that uses a quantitative methodology; 
and specifically, it is an instrumental study whose chief objective is to analyse the 
psychometric properties of an assessment measure (Montero and León, 2007). 
 
Participants 
The participants were recruited through casual non-probability sampling, using the snowball 
technique, among the relatives and acquaintances of university students during a period when 
they had no exams or assessed activities (from the second half of February through to the end 
of March). Initially, 338 questionnaires were recovered. However, after rejecting the 
incomplete ones, the final sample consisted of 259 people (79.5% women) aged between 18 
and 63 (mean=26.5; SD=10.7). Of the final sample, 95.4% were Caucasian. Almost all 
participants (91.5%) were born in Spain. The remaining participants were either born in Latin 
American countries (4.2%) or in European countries other than Spain. A total of 21.0% of the 
sample had no higher education qualifications, while 42.4% were current undergraduates, 





were single, 48.3% were married or in a relationship, and 2.7% were divorced or separated. 
Finally, 50.6% were unemployed, 47.0% worked, and the remaining 2.4% were retired or 
unfit for work.  
 
Procedure 
The following procedure was used to design the SICS-B, which we used to evaluate the 
content of each of the three basic beliefs, both in terms of the specific individual demands or 
needs and of the relation of each of these with the styles of thought in which this content can 
be expressed. Once we had defined the purpose of the study, each of the different types of 
content and styles of irrational thought contemplated in REBT was assigned to one of the 
three authors of the study (all of whom are certified specialists in this model of therapy). Each 
author then individually devised specific items for each content assigned to them (in its 
demand or false need modality), and for each of these in relation to the different styles of 
thought. Our intention was to write all the items in plain language that would be readily 
accessible to the general population (with a basic level of education). We therefore adopted 
colloquial expressions of the type that are often used to refer to the rational or irrational 
contents and styles that we intended to evaluate. Moreover, we aimed to capture the greatest 
possible variety of grammatical structures so as to avoid repeating the expressions typically 
associated with these contents and styles (e.g., I need…, I have to …, I must …, etc.) or with 
the way they are commonly integrated into phrases (if …, then…; I do not need … in order to 
…., etc.). Following this, each of the items that we had written individually was subjected to 
joint consideration by all three authors. At this stage, we revised and corrected the items until 
a final version met with the approval, in terms of the semantic and syntactic criteria required, 






Following Carretero-Dios and Pérez (2005), we drew up a long list of twice as many items as 
we expected to use for the final scale we were designing, in order to ensure a balanced 
representation of each of the sub-scales referring to the three basic items, with the best 
psychometric properties, after the corresponding analysis. In this way, we drew up a total of 
72 items, which were distributed into 12 specific subscales with the same proportion of items 
in each. These subscales evaluate both the three basic demand (or false need) contents (3) and 
also each of these contents in relation to the four irrational styles through which they can be 
expressed (3x4). Each of these specific subscales consisted of six items with different 
formats: three written in the irrational form and three as rational content (inverted). However, 
in accordance with the ideas of REBT, the SICS-B scores are corrected where necessary so as 
to be interpreted in the direction of irrationality. 
 
Meanwhile, SICS-B also allowed us to obtain seven “global” subscales that are made up of 
the total scores for each content in all the styles, together with those for the different styles in 
all the contents. In this way, we aim to offer different levels of analysis (specific and global), 
according to the aims and concerns behind the assessment. 
 
Once we had all agreed on the final 72 items of SICS-B, we deliberately mixed them up so as 
to avoid the presentation of consecutive items dealing with the same content or style. We then 
carried out a pilot study with a small group of psychologists from the Spanish Association of 
Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (Asociación Española de Terapia Racional Emotiva 
Conductual - AETREC) for them to verify the validity of the items. Their comments 






The format of the answers to the items is a 5-point Likert scale, which ranges from 0 to 4 (0: 
strongly disagree; 1: disagree; 2: neither agree nor disagree; 3: agree; 4: strongly agree), as 
this type of scale is the most commonly used to assess beliefs and attitudes. In addition, 
through the use of a Likert scale the scores obtained reflect a precise assessment of what is 
being measured, independently of the “rational” or “irrational” form in which the items are 
written. 
 
The participants answered the SICS-B-72 via the Internet using the SurveyMonkey platform 
on a completely voluntary basis and anonymously, after having given written informed 
consent, and they received no compensation of any type for participating. 
The study was approved by the Bioethics Committee of the University of Barcelona 
(Institutional Review Board: IRB00003099). 
  
Data analysis  
The reliability of SICS-B was assessed through an item-analysis (average inter-item 
correlation and item–total correlation) and an internal consistency analysis (ordinal α, and α 
coefficient without the respective item) of each subscale.  
 
In accordance with Zumbo, Gadermann, and Zeisser (2007), Elosua and Zumbo (2008), and 
Gadermann, Ghun, and Zumbo (2012), it is more appropriate to analyse the reliability of 
Likert-type scales by means of coefficients other than Cronbach’s alpha, such as ordinal alpha 
or Armor’s theta coefficient. The main reason is that Cronbach's alpha is an estimated 
coefficient on a matrix of Pearson's correlations that assumes the continuous nature of the 
variables analyzed. Therefore, when the variables do not meet the requirement of continuity 





reliability (Elosua and Zumbo, 2008; Zumbo, Gadermann, and Zeisser, 2007). We report both 
Cronbach's alpha and Ordinal alpha to record this negative effect. The Ordinal alpha, on the 
other hand, is estimated from polychoric correlation matrices and not from Pearson product–
moment correlations. In addition, when the distribution of the ordinal items is skewed or 
presents excessive kurtosis, and particularly if factorial analysis is to be performed, the 
calculation of polychoric correlations is also more suitable (Muthén and Kaplan, 1985; 1992; 
Domínguez, 2014). So, bearing in mind the ordinal nature of the answers to the items of the 
SICS-B (using a 5-point Likert scale), the reliability indices were obtained from the matrix of 
polychoric correlations of the items in each subscale. The respective polychoric correlation 
matrices were obtained using the FACTOR program, v. 10.3.01 (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 
2015). The same program was used to analyze the multivariate normal distribution of the data 
with Mardia’s coefficient (1970). 
 
The ordinal α internal consistency coefficients were calculated through the procedure 
proposed by Domínguez (2012), while the corresponding confidence intervals (95%) were 
computed using the module expressly created for this purpose by Domínguez and Merino-
Soto (2015). The analysis of items was performed with the STATISTICA program v.8 
(StatSoft, 2007) and the rest of the analyses were conducted with SPSS v. 21 (IBM Corp., 
released 2012). 
 
Analysis of the normal distribution of the scores for the items in each of the SICS-B sub-
scales was carried out using the contrast set of skewness and kurtosis (k2) reported by 
González, Abad, and Levy (2006). In accordance with this method, a value of k2 of over 5.99 
allows the null hypothesis (skewness and kurtosis of the normal distribution) to be rejected at 






Following Carretero-Dios and Pérez (2005), the criteria to determine the discriminatory 
power of the items, and thus decide which of them would constitute the definitive scale, were 
initially based on analysis of univariate statistical data (descriptors, skewness, and kurtosis). 
We also used the corrected correlation coefficient for the item with the total of the 
corresponding subscale (which had to be greater than .25 or .30), complemented with analysis 
of the alpha coefficient of the subscale without the respective item (as this has to increase 
when the item is removed). We then verified the average correlation between the items in 
each subscale (between .15 and .50; with consistency being greater, the larger the coefficient) 
comparing the initial version (SICS-B-72) and the definitive one (SICS-B-36).   
 
The content validity of the SICS-B-72 and the SICS-B-36 was investigated in the present 
study by means of a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), which complements a previous 
study conducted with exploratory factor analysis (Ruiz, Sorribes, and Suso, 2019). Because 
items were ordinal, but not continuous (i.e., categorical), we used the weighted least square 
mean and variance adjusted estimator (WLSMV), which does not assume a normal 
distribution and represents the preferred option for categorical and ordered data (Brown, 
2006). In line with the REBT theory, five different models were explored on both scales: one 
with 3 latent factors (only the 3 contents of irrational beliefs), another with 4 latent factors 
(only the 4 styles of irrational thinking), another combining the 3x4 latent factors (combining 
the 3 contents with the 4 styles), another integrating the 3x4 factors into 3 latent factors of 
second-order (contents), and finally another integrating the 3x4 factors into 4 latent factors of 
second-order (styles). Each model fit was evaluated with the Chi-square test (χ2), the root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), the comparative fit index (CFI), and the 





scores below .08 should be interpreted as showing a good fit. CFI and TLI scores above .95 
indicate an excellent fit, while values over .90 should be interpreted as revealing a good fit of 
the model to the data (Hu and Bentler, 1999; Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, and King, 
2006). In addition, we value as optimal factor loads those that were above .4 (Stevens, 2002; 
cited in Field, 2013), and calculate the proportion of variance explained for each item of the 
best model in the SICS-B-72 and the SICS-B-36.  
 
The CFA was conducted with Mplus, version 6.12 (Muthén and Muthén, 2011). 
 
The scores of the reverse items (that is, those that were written in the “rational” sense) were 
recoded (inverted) prior to the analyses. 
 
In what follows, we present the results of the psychometric data for the original scale with 72 
items (SICS-B-72) together with the definitive version containing just 36 items (SICS-B-36). 
This latter version consists of the three items with the best psychometric properties from each 
subscale (see Appendix 2). 
 
Results 
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics and internal consistency indices for SICS-B-72 and 
SICS-B-36.  
 
Insert Table 1 near here 
 
In the SICS-B-72, the three content scales (Ap, Pe, and Co), in correspondence with the styles 





and good (ordinal α between.72 and .89). Meanwhile, the reliability (ordinal α) of the total 
content scales was between 0.91 and 0.94; and that of the total style scales, between .87 and 
.91. This indicates more than acceptable reliability for both total scales. 
 
In the SICS-B-36, the three content scales (Ap, Pe, and Co), in correspondence with the four 
styles of thought (DEM, AWF, FI, and CON), also showed good reliability indices (ordinal α 
between .80 and .92). In addition, the reliability (ordinal α) of the total content scales ranged 
between .89 and .92. Similarly, the reliability (ordinal α) of the total style scales was between 
.82 and .90. All of these are within the 95% confidence interval, which also indicates good 
reliability. In addition, the average correlation between the items in each “specific” and 
“total” subscale was between .27 and .56. In both versions of SICS-B, the mean correlation 
between the items in the respective subscales was above the minimally acceptable limits, and 
they were higher for the SICS-B-36 version. 
 
Table 2 shows the data from the analysis of the items in the “Approval” (Ap) subscale for 
each style of thought, both for SICS-B-72 and for SICS-B-36. 
 
Insert Table 2 near here 
 
The univariate statistics for almost all the items (except for items 18 and 32 in the Ap-CON 
sub-scale) had standard deviations greater than 1, with their respective means being around 
the mid-point of the values on the scale (except for item 32), which indicates that practically 
all the Ap items had high discriminatory power. However, the contrast set of the skewness 
and kurtosis (k2) demonstrated that none of the items referring to this content in the different 






Concerning the SICS-B-72, the correlation coefficients of all the items with the total of their 
respective subscales (with the exception of items 18 and 23 in the Ap-CON subscale) showed 
an acceptable internal consistency (between .45 and .70). The same was also indicated by the 
reliability values for each subscale, as measured by the alpha coefficient without the 
respective item (which varied between .74 and .81), except for those in the Ap-CON subscale, 
which were below .70. 
 
The SICS-B-36 includes, for each subscale of Approval, the three items from the SICS-B-72 
with the best internal consistency values (item–total correlation and alpha without the item). 
Moreover, the correlation of each item is shown with the total of its own reduced subscale, 
along with the respective indices of reliability when we eliminate the item. In general, the 
items selected for the SICS-B-36 in the contents/style of Approval contribute to increasing the 
reliability of each of the subscales, if we consider the alpha without the respective item. If we 
compare the SICS-B-36 and the SICS-B-72, the item–total correlation coefficient tends to be 
lower in the former, except in Ap-CON, where it increases. 
 
Table 3 shows the data from the analysis of the specific items in the “Perfectionism” (Pe) 
subscale for each style of thought, both in the SICS-B-72 and the SICS-B-36. 
 
Insert Table 3 near here 
 
The univariate statistics for the Pe items also showed, in general, a good level of 






In the SICS-B-72 the correlation coefficients for each item with the total of their respective 
subscale ranged from .53 to .69, which indicates a good degree of discrimination. The alpha 
without the item was between .68 and .82. 
 
In the SICS-B-36 the three items selected for each subscale showed item–total correlation that 
varied from .52 to .66, and the indices of reliability, when we removed the respective items, 
were significantly reduced (compared with the SICS-B-72). This indicates the contribution of 
each item to the greater reliability of the SICS-B-36. 
 
Table 4 shows the data from the analysis of the specific items in the “Comfort” (Co) subscale 
for each style of thought and for both the SICS-B-72 and the SICS-B-36.  
 
Insert Table 4 near here 
 
For the Co contents in their various irrational styles, the corresponding items did not fit a 
normal distribution either (except for item 19 of Co-DEM). Considering the descriptors, in 
general, the items showed adequate variability, except for item 34 in the Co-DEM scale and 
35 in the Co-AWF scale. 
 
In the SICS-B-72, the item–total correlation of the different subscales varied from .25 to .70; 
and the alpha without the item was between .52 and .81. In the SICS-B-36, the correlation of 
each item with the total of its own subscale ranged from .36 to .66, and the indices of 






The multivariate descriptors skewness and kurtosis that were analysed by means of Mardia’s 
test demonstrated significant kurtosis of the data, which means that they did not follow a 
normal distribution either in the SICS-B-72 or in the SICS-B-36.  
 
With regards to the content validity of the scales, Table 5 contains the respective fit indices 
for the three models tested in the SICS-B-72 and the SICS-B-36 scales. 
 
Insert Table 5 near here 
 
As reported in Table 5, the CFA of the SICS-B-72 showed the best fit for the 3x4-factor 
model composed of the conjunction of the 3 contents in the 4 styles. A worse, yet acceptable 
fit was revealed for the 3 and 4-factor solutions. It is important to note that, in these two latter 
models, CFI and TLI values were clearly below the acceptable threshold, despite the RMSEA 
supported an adequate fit of the models. A closer look at the data revealed that the RMSEA of 
the baseline model in both cases was very small (between .155 and .156). As indicated by 
Kenny (2015), baseline model RMSEA scores below .158 result in non-informative CFA and 
TLI indices, so the RMSEA would be preferred in these cases to assess the fit of the models. 
Note also that the Chi-square test would suggest a poor model fit in all cases. However, it is 
frequent for models with a sufficiently large sample size, such as ours, to obtain such results. 
This again should emphasize the use of the RMSEA in our assessment of model fit. 
 
Similar to the SICS-B-72, the 3x4-factor model composed of the 3 contents joint with the 4 
styles obtained the best fit in the CFA of the SICS-B-36. Different from the SICS-B-72, a 






Table 6 and Table 7 show the standardized factor loadings and the proportion of explained 
variance of items of the 3x4-factor model (the one that obtained the best fit indices) for the 
SICS-B-72 and the SICS-B-36 scales, respectively. 
 
Insert Table 6 near here 
 
Overall, items of SICS-B-72 showed adequate factor loadings (i.e., above .40) and proportion 
of explained variance, with a few exceptions (i.e., items 24, 33, 52, 23, and 6). All factor 
loadings were significant (p < .001). 
 
Insert Table 7 near here 
 
Unlike SICS-B-72, all items in SICS-B-36 showed more adequate factor loads (i.e., all above 
.40, and all significant at p < .001). Consequently, the proportion of explained variance is also 
higher for all items of SICS-B-36. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The aim of this study was to analyse the psychometric properties of the Scale of Irrational 
Content and Styles - Basic (SICS-B), which we designed specifically to assess the contents of 
the three basic irrational beliefs (Ap: Approval, Pe: Perfectionism, and Co: Comfort) in their 
“demanding” (DEM) or false need modality, and also in relation to the other styles of thought 
that they can give rise to (AWF: Awfulizing, FI: frustration intolerance, or CON: 
condemnation) according to the most recent REBT theory (Ellis, 1994, 1999; Ellis et al., 






With respect to the internal consistency of the SICS-B, the three content scales (Ap, Pe, and 
Co) on their own (in their DEM modality), and in correspondence with the other styles of 
thought considered (AWF, FI, and CON), produced good reliability indices in each of their 
versions (average ordinal α around .85). In comparison, however, the SICS-B-36 presented 
indices that were slightly better than those of the SICS-B-72. This is supported by the average 
correlation between the items in the respective subscales, which are comparatively superior in 
the reduced version. The Ap-CON was the subscale of Approval, in relation to the different 
styles, that showed the lowest internal consistency indices (see Table 2). 
 
Regarding the content validity, the SICS-B is a multidimensional scale consisting of 3x4-
Factors (subscales). That is to say, our analyses support the need jointly consider both the 
contents and styles when interpreting the scale. While an acceptable fit was obtained when 
considering contents and styles separately with the SICS-B-72, the increase in the model fit 
using a combination of both components suggests that this would be the best solution to the 
data and, therefore, the best way to interpret the results, especially for the SICS-B-36. These 
findings are consistent with the theoretical basis REBT that considers that irrational beliefs 
can take the form of different contents in combination with particular thinking styles (Lega et 
al., 2002). The fact that each of the 3x4 combinations resulting from joining a specific content 
with a particular style cannot be grouped (unified) on the basis of the 3 contents or the 4 types 
of styles they share demonstrates their relative independence. That is, each of the 12 irrational 
tendencies has its own entity and they differ from each other, even if they share content or 
style. Therefore, the combination of both components (content and style) configures an 
irrational belief with its own meaning, which is different from that which denotes each of the 
contents or styles as a higher order category. In this sense, the SICS-B does not evaluate the 





of content x style constitutes a unit of irrational meaning itself, different from the others. 
Consequently, the total scores of the 3 contents or the 4 styles of the SICS-B (resulting from 
the respective partial scores) will be less informative, and more imprecise, than the specific 
scores of each of the 12 subscales that best characterizes the person. This fact supports the 
adequacy of the 3x4-Factors model to the data above the 3 and 4-factor models, which is 
further evidence of the robustness of the REBT theory from which the SICS-B has been 
designed. 
 
Another important finding of the CFA was that the majority of items of the SICS-B-72 and all 
items of the SICS-B-36 revealed an adequate adjustment to the corresponding subscales. This 
is important because this reflects that the construction of items was mostly successful. There 
were only a few exceptions of items in the long scale which were not sufficiently aligned with 
the presumed factor and this problem was solved in the short version of the scale eliminating 
the problematic items. Therefore, the allocation and direction of the items on the scale are 
mostly satisfactory and the fact that the SICS-B-36 has both an adequate fit and a good item 
functioning is encouraging and should support the use of this shortened version of the SICS-
B. 
 
The use of a CFA is a strength of the present investigation. While exploratory factor analyses 
of similar scales are also frequent, they tend to be data-driven as opposed to theory-driven. 
This is important because CFA allows confirming models that might not show the best fit to 
the data but do have the best fit to the theoretical model. This minimizes the risk to obtain 
different factorial solutions that are atheoretical and largely dependent on the characteristics 






Finally, we wish to make it clear that the present study presents certain limitations that need 
to be addressed in future analysis. These include the reduced sample size in relation to the 
extent of the scale, and especially in terms of the imbalance in the representation of the sexes, 
which limited our possibilities to analyse the existence of differences between men and 
women in the irrational contents and styles, which could be better characterised. Since the 
sample size of the present study is small, the means and standard deviations of the scale 
should not be considered representative of the population of Spain. However, this study 
provides a short version of the irrational belief scale (SICS-B-36) with which representative 
data from different populations (e.g., healthy populations or different clinical samples) can be 
obtained more quickly and easily. In addition, the convergent validity of SICS-B remains to 
be proven, which is also a limitation of the present study. Not having a validated scale in 
Spanish for the evaluation of irrational beliefs has made it impossible to analyze the 
convergent validity of the scale we present. However, that the data provided on the content 
validity of the SICS-B confirms the theoretical basis of the REBT, regarding the integration 
of content and styles of irrational beliefs, should minimize the negative impact of the 
impossibility of exploring the convergent validity of the scale. 
 
In conclusion, and despite these limitations, the good levels of reliability and validity of the 
contents of the subscales of SICS-B overcome the shortcomings of the ABI, and allow an 
evaluation with adequate identification of people bearing in mind their most characteristic 
contents and styles of irrational thought. This means that the results of this preliminary study 
support its use in the general population with the aim of assessment and classification 
(Carretero-Dios and Pérez, 2005), which is reason to continue study along these lines. 
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Appendix 1. The SICS-B-72 
 
 
TO WHAT DEGREE DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? 
 
Please make sure you have answered all the questions. 


































































1. I often think that things should be easier.  0 1 2 3 4 
2. * When I make a mistake, I don’t put myself down because of it. 0 1 2 3 4 
3. * I normally put up well with the frustration of not getting what I want. 0 1 2 3 4 
4. One of the worst things that can happen to a person is to be rejected. 0 1 2 3 4 
5. I get stressed out over everything being so complicated.  0 1 2 3 4 
6. * When people make me feel uncomfortable, I don’t think they do it deliberately. 0 1 2 3 4 
7. * I think that difficulties form part of life.  0 1 2 3 4 
8. * I’d be just as good a person even though not many people liked me.  0 1 2 3 4 
9. * I’m not hooked on always doing things as well as possible. 0 1 2 3 4 
10. * Just because my life is difficult doesn’t mean that I’m any less of a person than other 
people are. 
0 1 2 3 4 
11. * It’s not absolutely vital that the people around me like me.   0 1 2 3 4 
12. It’s awful to have defects and weaknesses. 0 1 2 3 4 
13. It really annoys me if people don’t like me.  0 1 2 3 4 
14. *I put up well with my own and other people’s mistakes. 0 1 2 3 4 
15. * It’s not so awful if I get criticised in public. 0 1 2 3 4 
16. I don’t like it when other people cause me a lot of problems.  0 1 2 3 4 
17. * I don’t have to be perfect. 0 1 2 3 4 
18. * I don’t think that people who reject me are necessarily bad people.  0 1 2 3 4 
19. I shouldn’t have so many complications in my life.  0 1 2 3 4 
20. * Doing things wrong is not the end of the world. 0 1 2 3 4 
21. I think that not being liked by others is very negative. 0 1 2 3 4 
22. One of the worst things that can happen to you is to have lots of problems. 0 1 2 3 4 
23. People who say nasty things about me are cruel and heartless for doing it. 0 1 2 3 4 
24. For me, it’s really bad if you don’t make an effort to do things well. 0 1 2 3 4 
25. I’m really strict about my mistakes. 0 1 2 3 4 
26. It’s horrible that life’s so complicated. 0 1 2 3 4 
27. It really annoys me not to meet other people’s expectations of me.  0 1 2 3 4 
28. It would be a disaster to often make mistakes. 0 1 2 3 4 
29. * I don’t get too bothered if people don’t like me. 0 1 2 3 4 
30. I think it’s really important to have the approval of those around me. 0 1 2 3 4 
31. I can’t stand making mistakes. 0 1 2 3 4 
32. If people don’t like me it’s because I’m less of a person than they are. 0 1 2 3 4 
33. * I don’t stress about always doing the right thing. 0 1 2 3 4 
34. * I usually see problems as part of life. 0 1 2 3 4 
35. * If my life is complicated, it’s not a disaster. 0 1 2 3 4 
Please continue on the next page 
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TO WHAT DEGREE DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? 
 
Please make sure you have answered all the questions. 


































































36. * It’s not a priority for me that other people like me.  0 1 2 3 4 
37. I can’t stand it when things don’t go as I want. 0 1 2 3 4 
38. I know that what other people think of me matters to me more than I’d like it to.  0 1 2 3 4 
39. * In my opinion, it’s not essential to do everything well. 0 1 2 3 4 
40. * I tend to face up to a conflict rather than avoid it. 0 1 2 3 4 
41. * Not meeting up to other people’s expectations of me is something that I don’t worry 
too much about. 
0 1 2 3 4 
42. If I get things wrong a lot, it’s because I’m a disaster. 0 1 2 3 4 
43. I’m one of those people who think that if you’re not going to do something well, then 
you might as well not do it. 
0 1 2 3 4 
44. It’s awful that people make my life so complicated. 0 1 2 3 4 
45. * What people think and say about me doesn’t affect me much. 0 1 2 3 4 
46. * I usually think that my frustrations are the same as everybody else’s. 0 1 2 3 4 
47. When someone doesn’t like me, I tend to think it’s because of my faults.  0 1 2 3 4 
48. People should make things easier for me. 0 1 2 3 4 
49. * When I make a mistake, I don’t beat myself up about it. 0 1 2 3 4 
50. I think badly of myself when I don’t do what I ought to.  0 1 2 3 4 
51. I get really annoyed about not doing things well. 0 1 2 3 4 
52. * I put up well with people being selfish. 0 1 2 3 4 
53. If things aren’t easy for me, it’s my own fault. 0 1 2 3 4 
54. * Being rejected by someone important is not such a big deal for me.  0 1 2 3 4 
55. I consider myself to be a real perfectionist. 0 1 2 3 4 
56. * I can handle my mistakes. 0 1 2 3 4 
57. * I deal fine with life’s problems. 0 1 2 3 4 
58. For me, being liked by others is really important.  0 1 2 3 4 
59. * I don’t see difficulties as a catastrophe. 0 1 2 3 4 
60. * If people say bad things about me it’s not a big deal. 0 1 2 3 4 
61. When I find things difficult, I think that I’m good for nothing. 0 1 2 3 4 
62. * I’m not perfect but even so I’m happy with myself. 0 1 2 3 4 
63. I can’t stand being criticised. 0 1 2 3 4 
64. I get really annoyed if I don’t do what I should. 0 1 2 3 4 
65. * I tend to look on the bright side of the bad things that happen to me. 0 1 2 3 4 
66. * It’s not the end of the world to have defects. 0 1 2 3 4 
67. * When people reject me, I don’t put myself down because of it.  0 1 2 3 4 
68. If people make things really complicated for me, it’s because they are bad people. 0 1 2 3 4 
69. It’s horrible when others think bad things about me. 0 1 2 3 4 
70. * For me, making mistakes is not a big deal. 0 1 2 3 4 
71. If I make mistakes, it’s because I’m useless. 0 1 2 3 4 
72. * I cope with it well when people criticise me. 0 1 2 3 4 
1 
 




TO WHAT DEGREE DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? 
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1. (38) I know that what other people think of me matters to me more than I’d like it to. 0 1 2 3 4 
2. (70) * For me, making mistakes is not a big deal. 0 1 2 3 4 
3. (37) I can’t stand it when things don’t go as I want. 0 1 2 3 4 
4. (47) When someone doesn’t like me, I tend to think it’s because of my faults. 0 1 2 3 4 
5. (64) I get really annoyed if I don’t do what I should. 0 1 2 3 4 
6. (35) * If my life is complicated, it’s not a disaster. 0 1 2 3 4 
7. (27) It really annoys me not to meet other people’s expectations of me. 0 1 2 3 4 
8. (62) * I’m not perfect but even so I’m happy with myself. 0 1 2 3 4 
9.   (1) I often think that things should be easier. 0 1 2 3 4 
10. (15) * It’s not so awful if I get criticised in public. 0 1 2 3 4 
11. (55) I consider myself to be a real perfectionist. 0 1 2 3 4 
12. (10) * Just because my life is difficult doesn’t mean that I’m any less of a person than 
other people are. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. (58) For me, being liked by others is really important. 0 1 2 3 4 
14. (66) * It’s not the end of the world to have defects. 0 1 2 3 4 
15.   (5) I get stressed out over everything being so complicated. 0 1 2 3 4 
16. (67) * When people reject me, I don’t put myself down because of it. 0 1 2 3 4 
17. (31) I can’t stand making mistakes. 0 1 2 3 4 
18. (59) * I don’t see difficulties as a catastrophe. 0 1 2 3 4 
19. (72) * I cope with it well when people criticise me. 0 1 2 3 4 
20. (50) I think badly of myself when I don’t do what I ought to. 0 1 2 3 4 
21. (48) People should make things easier for me. 0 1 2 3 4 
22. (60) * If people say bad things about me it’s not a big deal. 0 1 2 3 4 
23.   (9) * I’m not hooked on always doing things as well as possible. 0 1 2 3 4 
24. (53) If things aren’t easy for me, it’s my own fault. 0 1 2 3 4 
25. (36) * It’s not a priority for me that other people like me. 0 1 2 3 4 
26. (20) * Doing things wrong is not the end of the world. 0 1 2 3 4 
27. (57) * I deal fine with life’s problems. 0 1 2 3 4 
28. (32) If people don’t like me it’s because I’m less of a person than they are. 0 1 2 3 4 
29. (51) I get really annoyed about not doing things well. 0 1 2 3 4 
30. (26) It’s horrible that life’s so complicated. 0 1 2 3 4 
31. (63) I can’t stand being criticised. 0 1 2 3 4 
32. (71) If I make mistakes, it’s because I’m useless. 0 1 2 3 4 
33. (19) I shouldn’t have so many complications in my life. 0 1 2 3 4 
34. (69) It’s horrible when others think bad things about me. 0 1 2 3 4 
35. (17) * I don’t have to be perfect. 0 1 2 3 4 
36. (61) When I find things difficult, I think that I’m good for nothing. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
The original numbering of the items in the ECEI-B-72 is shown in parentheses. 
* Inverted items (statements in rational format), which are to be reverse scored. 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics and internal consistency indices of the SICS-B-72 and the SICS-B-36 
 
























Ap-DEM 6 259 11.20 4.46 .84 .88 [.85, .90] .48  3 259 5.55 2.86 .79 .88 [.85, .90] .56 
Ap-AWF 6 259 11.66 4.87 .79 .85 [.81, .88] .40  3 259 5.53 2.87 .78 .87 [.84, .90] .55 
Ap-FI 6 259 11.93 5.16 .81 .87 [.84, .90] .45  3 259 6.35 2.85 .73 .85 [.81, .88] .52 
Ap-CON  5* 259 6.59 3.49 .60 .77 [.71, .81] .28  3 259 4.02 2.62 .68 .85 [.81, .88] .47 
Ap-Total 23 259 41.39 16.31 .93 .94 [.92, .95] .38  12 259 21.45 9.48 .90 .92 [.90, .94] .45 
Pe-DEM 6 259 12.59 5.17 .79 .86 [.82, .90] .41  3 259 6.15 3.04 .73 .86 [.82, .89] .50 
Pe-AWF 6 259 9.08 4.38 .73 .82 [.78, .86] .35  3 259 3.45 2.50 .72 .87 [.84, .90] .53 
Pe-FI 6 259 12.66 4.68 .77 .85 [.81, .88] .38  3 259 6.61 2.78 .76 .87 [.84, .90] .53 
Pe-CON 6 259 8.71 5.34 .83 .89 [.86, .91] .49  3 259 3.49 2.79 .73 .87 [.84, .90] .54 
Pe-Total 24 259 43.06 16.50 .92 .93 [.91, .94] .36  12 259 19.70 8.99 .88 .91 [.89, .93] .41 
Co-DEM  5* 259 7.88 3.22 .64 .77 [.71, .81] .27  3 259 5.58 2.34 .69 .82 [.78, 86] .42 
Co-AWF 6 259 7.72 4.69 .82 .88 [.85, .90] .47  3 259 3.52 2.43 .75 .87 [.84, .90] .54 
Co-FI 6 259 11.93 4.28 .70 .80 [.75, .84] .29  3 259 5.47 2.48 .62 .80 [.75, .84] .36 
Co-CON 6 259 8.11 3.93 .58 .76 [.70, .81] .23  3 259 3.85 2.49 .57 .80 [.75, .84] .37 
Co-Total 23 259 35.66 13.31 .89 .91 [.88, .93] .29  12 259 18.42 7.84 .86 .89 [.86, .91] .36 
DEM-Total 17 259 31.67 10. 26 .84 .87 [.84, .90] .26  9 259 17.28 5.93 .75 .82 [.78, .86] .27 
AWF-Total 18 259 28.48 11.66 .89 .91 [.89, .93] .34  9 259 12.50 6.40 .85 .89 [.86, .91] .42 
     FI-Total 18 259 36.54 11.93 .89 .91 [.89, .93] .32  9 259 18.43 6.80 .84 .88 [.85, .90] .39 
CON-Total 17 259 23.42 10.85 .87 .90 [.87, .92] .33  9 259 11.36 6.90 .85 .90 [.87, .92] .46 
 
Note: N: Sample size; M: Mean; SD: Standard Deviation; CI: Confidence Interval (95%) for Ordinal α.  * In the subscales Ap-CON and Co-DEM items 8 and 7 were eliminated because 
no participant had marked the answer option ‘totally agree’, which made it impossible to obtain the corresponding matrices of polychoric correlations for the calculation of 










Table 2. Analysis of items of the “Approval” subscales (Ap) of the SICS-B-72 and the SICS-B-36 
 
  Univariate statistics SICS-B-72 SICS-B-36 

















11 1,50 [1.32, 1.69] 1.17    .293 -1.079 16.530 .58 .82  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
30 2.28 [2.10, 2.46] 1.11 - .266 -  .934 12.668 .50 .79  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
36 1.48 [1.31, 1.65] 1.08    .316 -  .820 11.752 .65 .76  36 .65 .69 
38 2.25 [2.04, 2.45] 1.27 - .293 -1.110 17.274 .70 .75  38 .63 .72 
45 1.86 [1.68, 2.04] 1.14 - .003 -1.119 13.730 .63 .76  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
58 1.83 [1.66, 2.00] 1.06   .025 -  .836 7.690 .65 .76  58 .62 .72 
Ap-AWF 
4 2.06 [1.85, 2.26] 1.28 - .142 -1.182 16.203 .46 .78  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
15 2.41 [2.22, 2.61] 1.22 - .328 -1.042 16.623 .61 .75  15 .60 .74 
21 1.25 [1.08, 1.43] 1.12   .582 -  .687 20.031 .50 .77  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
54 2.81 [2.63, 2.98] 1.10 - .906    .067 36.049 .48 .78  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
60 1.72 [1.54, 1.90] 1.12   .004 -1.030 11.633 .62 .74  60 .67 .65 
69 1.40 [1.22, 1.57] 1.10   .384 - .892 15.191 .62 .74  69 .60 .73 
Ap-FI 
13 1.57 [1.38, 1.77] 1.20   .188 -1.187 16.999 .59 .80  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
27 2.41 [2.21, 2.61] 1.25 - .529 - .806 19.396 .62 .79  27 .44 .82 
29 1.78 [1.60, 1.97] 1.14    .126 -1.104 14.060 .54 .81  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
41 2.40 [2.05, 2.42] 1.16 - .328 -  .779 11.372 .55 .81  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
63 1.83 [1.65, 2.02] 1.14   .098 - .963 10.589 .65 .79  63 .64 .59 
72 2.09 [1.91, 2.28] 1.15 - .175 - .960 11.448 .62 .79  72 .66 .57 
Ap-CON* 
18 1.20 [1.04, 1.36]    .99   .670 - .242 20.330 .28 .67  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
23 1.37 [1.21, 1.54] 1.04   .347 - .671 10.218 .23 .69  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
32   .55 [  .42,   .69]   .84 1.673 2.632 198.710 .48 .62  32 .50 .70 
47 1.78 [1.58, 1.98] 1.27   .089 -1.207 16.321 .45 .62  47 .59 .57 
67 1.69 [1.50, 1.88] 1.20   .138 -1.147 15.260 .53 .58  67 .57 .58 
 
Note: M: Mean; CI: Confidence Interval (95%); SD: Standard Deviation; As: Asymmetry; Ku: Kurtosis. k2: Joint contrast statistic of symmetry and kurtosis. 






Table 3. Analysis of items of the “Perfectionism” subscales (Pe) of the SICS-B-72 and the SICS-B-36 
 
  Univariate statistics SICS-B-72  SICS-B-36 

















9 1.89 [1.70, 2.09] 1.23   .032 -1.230 16.633 .59 .77  9  .52 .73 
17 1.87 [1.66, 2.08] 1.31   .105 -1.221 16.830 .67 .75  17 .66 .56 
25 2.38 [2.20, 2.56] 1.13 - .525 -  .640 16.579 .57 .77  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
39 1.84 [1.66, 2.02] 1.23   .085 -1.095 13.463 .52 .78  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
43 2.23 [2.03, 2.43] 1.24 - .241 -1.057 14.797 .40 .81  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
55 2.39 [2.19, 2.58] 1.22 - .322 -  .993 15.359 .63 .76  55 .55 .69 
Pe –AWF 
12 1.11 [  .93, 1.29] 1.14   .787 - .452 29.404 .49 .71  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
20 1.02 [  .86, 1.18] 1.02   .898 -  .015 35.370 .53 .70  20 .60 .68 
24 2.38 [2.20, 2.56] 1.14 - .487 - .568 13.939 .24 .77  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
28 2.15 [1.97, 2.34] 1.18 - .301 - .978 14.461 .51 .70  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
66   .81 [  .66,   .96]   .94 1.200    .988 73.858 .62 .68  66 .66 .63 
70 1.61 [1.43, 1.79] 1.15   .177 -1.091 14.425 .56 .69  70 .55 .75 
Pe –FI 
14 1.82 [1.64, 1.99] 1.09  .250 -  .949 12.616 .48 .76  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
31 1.86 [1.67, 2.05] 1.20 - .007 -1.098 13.221 .58 .74  31 .60 .69 
33 1.99 [1.80, 2.17] 1.15 - .023 -  .953 9.981 .42 .78  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
51 2.58 [2.41, 2.75] 1.08 - .684 -  .405 22.318 .61 .73  51 .64 .65 
56 2.22 [2.04, 2.40] 1.12 - .409 -  .787 14.128 .50 .76  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
64 2.17 [1.99, 2.35] 1.10 - .202 -  .914 10.949 .62 .73  64 .57 .72 
Pe –CON 
2 1.86 [1.66, 2.06] 1.26 - .048 -1.262 17.563 .57 .84  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
42 1.28 [1.09, 1.47] 1.18    .615 -  .684 21.718 .64 .82  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
49 2.08 [1.90, 2.27] 1.16 - .180 -1.037 13.212 .62 .83  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
50 1.59 [1.39, 1.78] 1.23   .241 -1.079 15.313 .66 .82  50 .59 .72 
62 1.17 [  .99, 1.36] 1.17   .872 - .164 33.644 .65 .82  62 .62 .69 
 71   .73 [  .56,   .90] 1.06 1.467 1.213 110.518 .69 .82  71 .63 .68 
 
Note: M: Mean; CI: Confidence Interval (95%); SD: Standard Deviation; As: Asymmetry; Ku: Kurtosis. k2: Joint contrast statistic of symmetry and kurtosis.  






Table 4. Analysis of items of the "Comfort" subscales (Co) of the SICS-B-72 and the SICS-B-36 
 
  Univariate statistics SICS-B-72 SICS-B-36 

















1 2.32 [2.16, 2.49] 1.01 -  .389 -  .386 8.270 .40 .58  1 .45 .65 
19 1.98 [1.83, 2.14]   .99 -  .080 -  .398 2.017 .49 .54  19 .59 .47 
34   .85 [  .71,   .98]   .85 1.090 1.273 69.876 .35 .60  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
40 1.45 [1.26, 1.64] 1.19    .465 -  .854 17.480 .25 .65  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
48 1.26 [1.10, 1.42]   .98    .362 -  .673 10.713 .43 .56  48 .46 .64 
Co –AWF 
22 1.55 [1.37, 1.72] 1.10    .376 -  .887 14.827 .59 .81  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
26 1.32 [1.16, 1.49] 1.05    .390 -  .729 12.498 .70 .79  26 .54 .77 
35   .99 [  .84, 1.14]   .93    .816    .022 29.208 .68 .80  35 .66 .64 
44 1.33 [1.16, 1.50] 1.06    .398 -  .714 12.537 .61 .81  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
59 1.19 [1.03, 1.35]   .99    .693 -  .236 21.673 .64 .80  59 .63 .67 
65 1.33 [1.15, 1.52] 1.17    .644 -  .595 22.071 .47 .84  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Co –FI 
3 2.01 [1.83, 2.20] 1.18 - .130 -1.097 13.936 .49 .66  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
5 1.70 [1.52, 1.88] 1.14    .107 -  .974 10.904 .48 .66  5 .43 .54 
16 1.59 [1.42, 1.76] 1.07    .109 -  .928 9.963 .44 .67  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
37 2.25 [2.08, 2.43] 1.11 -  .326 -  .935 14.246 .53 .64  37 .42 .55 
52 2.86 [2.68, 3.04] 1.14 - .780 -  .345 27.988 .26 .73  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
57 1.51 [1.35, 1.68] 1.03   .384 -  .648 11.071 .47 .66  57 .46 .49 
Co –CON 
6 1.64 [1.47, 1.82] 1.11   .468 -  .513 12.491 .29 .62  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
10   .98 [  .82, 1.15] 1.05   .863 -  .050 32.691 .38 .59  10 .36 .64 
46 1.57 [1.39, 1.76] 1.14   .402 -  .849 14.991 .28 .63  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
53 1.41 [1.24, 1.58] 1.07   .438 -  .548 11.707 .44 .57  53 .46 .52 
61 1.46 [1.26, 1.65] 1.24   .499 -  .966 21.152 .53 .52  61 .52 .41 
 68 1.02 [  .87, 1.17]   .95   .754 -  .038 24.950 .30 .62  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
 
Note: M: Mean; CI: Confidence Interval (95%); SD: Standard Deviation; As: Asymmetry; Ku: Kurtosis. k2: Joint contrast statistic of symmetry and kurtosis. 






Table 5. Fit indices for tested models in the SICS-B-72 and the SICS-B-36 
Scale Models χ2 df p RMSEA IC (90%) CFI TLI 
SICS-B-
72 
3-Factors 4182.889 2342 < .001 .055 (.052, .058) .878 .875 
4-Factors 4790.174 2339 < .001 .064 (.061, .066) .838 .833 
3x4-Factors 3689.842 2279 < .001 .049 (.046, .052) .907 .901 
(3x4)*3-Factors 2nd-order  4241.675 2333 < .001 .056 (.054, .059) .874 .870 
(3x4)*4-Factors 2nd-order 4411.980 2327 < .001 .056 (.056, .061) .862 .857 
SICS-B-
36 
3-Factors 1647.296 591 < .001 .083 (.078, .088) .880 .872 
4-Factors 1974.619 588 < .001 .095 (.091, .100) .843 .831 
3x4-Factors 1078.916 528 < .001 .063 (.058, .069) .937 .925 
(3x4)*3-Factors 2nd-order  1483.732 582 < .001 .077 (.072, .082) .898 .889 
















 11 .679 .46 .54 
 30 .640 .41 .59 
 36 .765 .59 .41 
Ap-DEM 38 .816 .67 .33 
 45 .749 .56 .44 
 58 .697 .49 .51 
 9 .747 .56 .44 
 17 .754 .57 .43 
 25 .747 .56 .44 
Pe-DEM 39 .724 .53 .48 
 43 .363 .13 .82 
 55 .598 .36 .64 
 1 .476 .23 .78 
 19 .568 .32 .68 
 34 .675 .46 .55 
Co-DEM 40 .558 .31 .69 
 48 .560 .31 .69 
 4 .533 .28 .72 
 15 .717 .51 .49 
 21 .626 .39 .61 
Ap-AWF 54 .598 .36 .64 
 60 .760 .58 .42 
 69 .775 .60 .40 
 12 .640 .41 .59 
 20 .620 .38 .62 
 28 .674 .45 .55 
Pe-AWF 66 .777 .60 .40 
 70 .674 .45 .55 
 24 .332 .11 .89 
 22 .651 .42 .58 
 35 .797 .64 .36 
 26 .762 .58 .42 
Co-AWF 44 .692 .48 .52 
 59 .831 .69 .31 
 65 .656 .43 .57 
 13 .748 .56 .44 
 27 .781 .61 .39 
 29 .693 .48 .52 
Ap-FI 41 .593 .35 .65 
 63 .760 .58 .42 
 72 .713 .51 .49 
 14 .630 .40 .60 
 31 .773 .60 .40 
 33 .393 .15 .85 
Pe-FI 51 .711 .51 .49 
 56 .627 .39 .61 
 64 .692 .48 .52 
 3 .655 .43 .57 
 5 .574 .33 .67 
 16 .469 .22 .78 
Co-FI 37 .676 .46 .54 
 57 .734 .54 .46 
 52 .268 .07 .93 
 18 .420 .18 .82 
 23 .346 .12 .88 
Ap-CON 32 .669 .45 .55 
 47 .632 .40 .60 
 67 .745 .56 .44 
 2 .602 .36 .64 
 42 .757 .57 .43 
 49 .757 .57 .43 
Pe-CON 50 .722 .52 .48 
 62 .764 .58 .42 
 71 .799 .64 .36 
 10 .433 .19 .81 
 46 .441 .19 .81 
Co-CON 53 .506 .26 .74 
 61 .807 .65 .35 
 68 .421 .18 .82 
 6 .285 .08 .92 







Table 7. Factor loadings and proportion of explained 









 36 .776 .60 .40 
Ap-DEM 38 .848 .72 .28 
 58 .712 .51 .49 
 9 .784 .61 .39 
Pe-DEM     17 .792 .63 .37 
 55 .609 .37 .63 
 1 .650 .42 .58 
Co-DEM     19 .755 .57 .43 
 48 .694 .48 .52 
 15 .726 .53 .47 
Ap-AWF    60 .790 .62 .38 
 69 .806 .65 .35 
 20 .676 .46 .54 
Pe-AWF    66 .851 .72 .28 
 70 .719 .52 .48 
 26 .723 .52 .48 
Co-AWF  35 .765 .59 .41 
 59 .825 .68 .32 
 27 .774 .60 .40 
Ap-FI 63 .810 .66 .34 
 72 .755 .57 .43 
 31 .835 .70 .30 
Pe-FI 51 .735 .54 .46 
 64 .719 .52 .48 
 5 .562 .32 .68 
Co-FI 37 .614 .38 .62 
 57 .699 .49 .51 
 32 .703 .49 .51 
Ap-CON    47 .661 .44 .56 
 67 .772 .60 .40 
 50 .698 .49 .51 
Pe-CON 62 .753 .57 .43 
 71 .788 .62 .38 
 10 .467 .22 .78 
Co-CON 53 .530 .28 .72 
 61 .869 .76 .24 
Note. All factor loadings were significant (p < .001) 
 
 
 
